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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
U.S. Const. amend IV-
The right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized
N.Y. CoNs. art. I, § 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized
COURT OF APPEALS
Presentment Agency v. Muhammad F.
State v. Boswell1
(Decided November 30, 1999)
Muhammad F., a juvenile, and Keith Boswell, an adult, were
both tried for drug related offenses in separate proceedings.2 Their
arrests were a result of random police stops of livery vehicles in
which the respective defendants were passengers The question
presented to the New York Court of Appeals was whether the
suspicionless stops of livery vehicles by ununiformed New York
City police officers on a roving patrol in unmarked cars, leading to
the arrests of passengers, constitutes an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
1 94 N.Y.2d 136, 700 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1999).
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Constitution The Court of Appeals held the stops violative of the
Fourth Amendment. In a dissenting opinion,6 Justice Smith held
the stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution,7 nor did they violate Article I, Section Twelve of the
New York Constitution.'
The facts leading to the arrests of Muhammad F. and Keith
Boswell are quite similar. Due to a high incidence of robberies
and violence against taxi drivers, the Livery-Taxi Task Force was
created.9 Ne* York City police officers assigned to the Task
Force targeted "certain neighborhoods"' at certain hours," in
order to conduct random stops of livery vehicles with passengers. 2
The purpose of the stops was to allow the police to give taxi
drivers safety information and question the drivers as to their
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affinnation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
Both defendants also asserted violations of the New York State Constitution,
however, the New York Constitution was not interpreted by the majority.
Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 140, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
I1d.
6 MuhammadF., 94 N.Y.2d at 149, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 84 (Smith, J. dissenting).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
" Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 140, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 78. Trial testimony of the
commander of the Street Crimes Unit showed that 3,600 robberies of taxi
drivers had occurred in 1992. Id. at 151,700 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
10 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 140, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The opinion does not
disclose which neighborhoods the officers targeted. Id.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
present safety, while monitoring the passengers' behavior to
determine if the taxi drivers were in possible present danger. 3
In Muhammad F., plainclothes police officers in an unmarked
police car pulled over the cab in which Muhammad F. was riding,
in order "to conduct safety checks."14 One officer determined that
Muhammad F. was "acting suspiciously,"'" and ordered him and
other passengers out of the car.16  A search of the back seat
revealed a "paper lunch-style bag containing crack cocaine."' 7
Muhammad F. was placed under arrest. 8 The trial court denied a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop.' 9
The Appellate Division reversed, however, holding that the
evidence obtained was the product of an unconstitutional seizure.20
Leave was granted to the presentment agency2 to appeal the
decision.'
Similarly, in Boswell, plainclothes officers in an unmarked
police car pulled over the cab in which Boswell was riding.23 The
officers noticed Boswell attempting to "conceal a plastic bag,"' 4
13 Id.
'4 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 141,700 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
' Id. The officer observed a passenger "lean forward and push something under
the front seat of the vehicle." Id. at 149, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
16 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 141,700 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
17 Id.
8 Id. The arrest occurred after Muhammad F. admitted the drugs belonged to
him. Id. at 149, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
19 MuhammadF., 94 N.Y.2d at 141,700 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
o Muhammad F. v. Presentment Agency, 255 A.D.2d 168, 683 N.Y.S.2d 477
(1998). The Appellate Division found the procedures employed by the police to
be "far too... discretion[ary]" to comply with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Id.
21 New York's Family Court Act provides that "[o]nly a presentment agency
may originate a juvenile delinquent proceeding." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 310.1
(McKinney 1983). The presentment agency is generally a county attorney,
corporation counsel, or district attorney. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 310.1., Practice
Commentary (McKinney 1983).
' Muhammad F., 255 A.D.2d 168, 683 N.Y.S.2d 477.
2 Id. at 142,700 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
24 Id. Boswell "kick[ed] a bag under the front seat of the vehicle." Id. at 150,
700 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
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and ordered him out of the car.' The police found that the bag
contained "packets of crack cocaine,"2 6 and arrested Boswell as a
result.27 As in the case of Muhammad F., Boswell's attorney
moved to have the evidence suppressed, but here, the motion was
gred.28 .Howevzr;the Appellate Division reversed and granted
leave for Boswell to appeal the decision.29
In determining whether the stops of the livery vehicles in these
cases were constitutional, the New York Court of Appeals relied
on Brown v. Texas,30 a federal case which held that the
reasonableness of suspicionless stops of automobiles on public
highways31 depends on "a balance between the public interest and
the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers."3  This balancing approach would
require the court to weigh '[1] the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, [2] the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and [3] the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.' 3 3  The Court emphasized the critical
importance in seizure cases of an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy not being subjected to arbitrary invasions




29 People v. Boswell, 255 A.D.2d 173, 683 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1998).
30 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Brown was stopped by police officers after the officers
witnessed Brown walk away from another man in an alley. When officers asked
Brown to identify himself, he refused and was subsequently arrested under a
state law which made it a criminal act for a person to refuse to identify himself
when an officer stopped him and requested the information. The question
presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether Brown was lawfully
seized by the police for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 48-50.
31 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1977) (applying
the Brown reasonableness test to situations where police conduct stops of
motorists on public highways).
' Brown, 443 U.S. at 50 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975)). See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
13 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 142, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80 (quoting Brown,
443 U.S. at 50-5 1).
670 [Vol 16
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"solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field,"'"
because Brown requires the seizures to be "carried out pursuant to
a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers." '35 The Court looked at many cases where
arbitrary police stops of motorists was challenged.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,36 the United States Supreme
Court held that "officers must have a reasonable suspicion to
justify roving-patrol stops,"'37 where the officer wants to question
vehicle occupants.38 Although there was a demanding public
interest "to prevent the illegal entry of aliens at the Mexican
Border, 3 9 random stops of automobiles by Border Patrol officers
on a roving patrol to review immigration statuses of automobile
occupants, while "modest,'" was unconstitutional in light of the
fact that the procedures employed were unreasonably "broad and
unlimited,'t 1  and provided for "potentially unlimited
interference't 2 with residents' use of the highways "at the sole
discretion of Border Patrol officers." 3
3 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 142, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (citing Brown, 443
U.S. at 51).
35 Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. The Brown court did not define "explicit, neutral
limitations," however, in subsequent cases, discussed infra, the Court looked at
whether official police policies imposed explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of the officers in regard to the seizures at issue.
36 442 U.S. 873 (1975). Border Patrol officers conducted a random stop of the
car in which Brignoni-Ponce was a passenger in order to question its occupants
as to their United States citizenship status. The officers' sole reason for
stopping the car was that the occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The
United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the stop
constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 875-
76.
37 Id. at 882.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 878. The Court referred to estimated figures compiled by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service which showed that, at the time the case
was decided, there were possibly "10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the
country.' Id.






Foote: Presentment Agency v Muhammad F.
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
In United States v. Maruinez-Fuerte," however, the Supreme
Court upheld suspicionless stops by Border Patrol officers. Here,
unlike Brignoni-Ponce,4 the Border Patrol officers were
conducting the automobile stops at a fixed check point near the
Mexican border, and provided many opportunities for motorists to
see they would be required to stop.' The Court again spoke of the
strong public interest in controlling the flow of illegal aliens into
the United States from the Mexican border,47 and determined that
the "objective intrusion"a of stopping and visually inspecting the
vehicle, and asking questions, outweighed the "subjective
intrusion"49 of the fear and concern generated by the stop in lawful
travelers. The Court held that the subjective intrusion is
"appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop,"5' because
motorists "can see that other vehicles are being stopped [and] can
see visible signs of the officers' authority, [so that they are] much
less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."' In fact,
fixed checkpoints, unlike patrol stops, "reassur[e] law-abiding
motorists that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve
the public interest."'52 Also, officers did not choose where the
44 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Respondents were arrested by Border Patrol officers at
a highway checkpoint 66 miles from the Mexican border. The question
presented was whether the checkpoint stops complied with the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 545.
45 442 U.S. 873.
46 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-46. Within a one mile stretch, four large
flashing signs warned motorists to stop ahead for U.S. Officers, traffic cones
narrowed the traffic into two lanes where a Border Patrol officer could be seen
in full uniform, Border Patrol veh'icles with flashing lights kept motorists from
using the closed lanes, a Border Patrol office building was located nearby, and
floodlights were used for nighttime operations. Id.
4 Id. at 556-57. The Court previously discussed the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's estimation of the large number of illegal immigrants
already in the United States, put forth in Brignoni-Ponce. Id. at 551. See supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
4' Id. at 558.
49 Id.
soId.
5' Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
894-95 (1975)).
52 Id. at 559.
672 [Vol 16
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checkpoints would be; checkpoint locations were chosen by the
responsible officials.' Hence, the Court determined that the fixed
checkpoints provided "less room for abusive or harassing stops
than there [is] in the case of roving-patrol stops,"- and likely
advanced "Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the
intrusion on the general motoring public."5
Following Martinez-Fuerte, in Delmvare v. Prouse,56 the
Supreme Court determined the validity of a suspicionless stop by a
police officer of a randomly chosen vehicle in order to conduct a
driver license and registration check. The Court weighed the
state's "vital interest in ... ensuring that licensing, registration,
and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed,"' and
whether the exercise of a random check "was a sufficiently
productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth
Amendment interests."" But the Court reiterated its position that,
absent reasonable suspicion, seizures of this sort "must be
undertaken pursuant to previously specified 'neutral criteria."'5 9 In
Prouse, the Court determined that the private intrusion was
unnecessary because the state's interest could be satisfied in a less
intrusive manner.'
I Id. The Court found it likely that enforcement officials, responsible for
resource allocation decisions, were not likely to "locate a checkpoint where it
bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class." Id.
4Id.
55 Id. at 60.
56 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Highway Patrol officers conducted a random stop of
Prouse's vehicle in order to check his driver license and car registration for the
purpose of ensuring Prouse was driving legally. The officer smelled marijuana
smoke and saw marijuana on the car floor. Prouse was subsequently arrested.
The question presented was whether the random stop of vehicles to conduct
driver license and registration checks constituted an unlawful seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 650.
1 Id. at 658. Although the state produced "no statistics," the Court recognized
the extent of the need for highway safety and the danger to life highway travel
poses. Id.
58 Id. at 659.
59 Id. at 662 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978)).
60 Id. at 659-60. Specifically, the Court noted that officers could still use the
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However, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 61 the
Supreme Court held suspicionless stops of vehicles to conduct
sobriety checks at checkpoints constitutional. The Court
recognized that the state's interest in eradicating the drunken
driving pro1WJem was indisputable,6' and, as in Martinez-Fuerte, the
officers were following proper guidelines and procedures
governing checkpoint operations.63 However, the Court carefully
noted that the propriety of the police procedures questioned under
the Brown balancing test should not be governed by the fact that
public interests are advanced, because determination of
"which... techniques should be employed to deal with a serious
public danger"' should be left to "politically accountable
officials."'
Using the above established U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
Muhammad F. and Keith Boswell asserted that the absence of a
fixed checkpoint invalidated the seizures in their respective cases.'
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument:
The Supreme Court has not adopted a per se rule
banning all such stops and requiring a fixed
checkpoint or roadblock in all cases. Suspicionless
patrol stops are suspect as a general matter because
of both their elevated potential intrusiveness and
their greater opportunities for the unlimited exercise
of discretion by police; no such stop has been
upheld by the Supreme Court or our Court when it
was conducted at random. Suspicionless stops,
61 496 U.S. 444 (1990). Sitz, a motorist, brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of the state's use of highway checkpoints to stop motorists and
conduct sobriety checks. The question presented was whether the procedure
employed by the state constituted an unlawful seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id at 447-48.
62 Id. at 451. The Court commented on statistical evidence showing that
"[d]runk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time
span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars
in property damage." Id.
63 Id. at 453.
64 id.
65Id.
66 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 145, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
674 [Vol 16
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 2, Art. 39
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/39
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
however, of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops to check driver license and registration are
permissible.67
The Court looked to its own decision in People v. John BB.,' in
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of uniform and
nondiscriminatory patrol stops of vehicles after a series of
burglaries was discovered.' Under the Brown reasonableness test,
the Court held that the state's interest in acquiring information
regarding the burglaries outweighed the "momentary [personal]
inconvenience to motorists."7 The Court found the procedures
employed by the police were not arbitrary,7 because "the roving
patrol was limited to stopping vehicles located in the region in
which there had been a large number of burglaries," and
traditional alternatives would be ineffective in a "sparsely
populated area."
In applying Brown and John BB. to the instant case, the Court
found the taxi stops to be "unreasonable and invalid."74 Although
the procedures employed by the police were clearly not arbitrary,
given the strong governmental interest in "protecting victim-prone
taxicab drivers late at night on urban streets from a crime wave of
violent robberies and homicides by disseminating information to
the drivers and preventing crimes that are in progress or
67 Id. at 145-46,700 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
61 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1010 (1982). After a random vehicle stop, police seized a pellet gun and
speakers from a rifle case inside the respondent's car. The question presented to
the New York Court of Appeals was whether the patrol stops of vehicles
comported with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 485-86, 438 N.E.2d at 866, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 160.
69 Id. at 482,438 N.E.2d at 866,453 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
70 Id. at 486, 438 N.E.2d at 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
71 Id. The Court noted that arbitrariness of the state action is not controlling, but
elimination of the element "has been identified time and again as a critical factor
in determining the reasonableness of official investigative activity of an
intrusive nature." Id.
72Id.
3 Id. The Court compared the roving roadblocks in this situation to the Border
Patrol checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte. Id
7' Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 146, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
2000
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imminent,"75 decisions as to which techniques should have been
employed were for New York City law enforcement officials to
make, not for the individual police officers.7 6 Also, no guidelines
were written for officers to follow and, while the stops were
carried out pursuant to general verbal instructions by superior
officers, determining which cars to stop was discretionary with the
patrol officers, who also were not required to keep a written record
of their patrol activity.' In other words, the Task Force failed to
take measures to "mitigate the constitutional infirmity of
'standardless and unconstrained discretion of the official in the
field." 78
In considering the objective intrusion of conducting safety
checks and possibly searching the back seats of the taxis, and the
subjective intrusion of the random stops, conducted at night, by
non-uniformed officers in unmarked cars, taking motorists by
surprise and possibly striking fear in law-abiding travelers, the
Court determined that the subjective intrusion would have been
diminished had the New York City Police Department employed a
"uniform system for stopping cars."'79
Finally, the prosecution failed to submit evidence that a roving
patrol stop, such as the one at issue, as opposed to a fixed
checkpoint stop conducted by uniformed officers, "was a
reasonably effective means of furthering the State interest in
reducing violent crimes against taxi drivers,"'  nor did the
prosecution show that there were no less intrusive means to
75 Id.
76 Id.
71 Id. at 148, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
78 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 147-48, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 83 (citing Prouse, 440
U.S. at 661). For example, the Court recognized that procedures could have
been implemented whereby officers stopped one car in every two, three or four.
Id. at 148,700 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
79 MuhammadF., 94 N.Y.2d at 147, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 83 (citing People v. Scott,
63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984)). A road block was
established pursuant to a written directive from the County Sheriff, and officers
were prohibited from administering sobriety tests unless they observed specific
criteria listed in the written directive to be indicative of intoxication. Scott at
522, 473 N.E.2d at 1,483 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
g Muhammad F. at 146-47, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
676 [Vol1 16
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prevent crime directed at taxi drivers.8 ' Also, there was no
showing that a "stationary checkpoint by uniformed officers in
marked police cars was 'impractical."'"
The Court found "a failure to either establish the reasonableness
of the patrol stops [under the Brown balancing test], or to satisfy
the constitutional requirement that the stops were 'carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of the individual officers."'" Therefore, it affirmed the
Appellate Division's reversal order in the case of Muhammad F.
and reversed the Appellate Division's reversal order in the case of
Keith Boswell.'
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Smith argued that a responsive
policy to criminal activities against taxicab drivers can be
"reasonable and consistent"' with federal and state constitutional
requirements.s6 To pass constitutional muster, "a policy must be
uniform and nondiscriminatory [and] the policy cannot be used as
a pretext for harassing innocent citizens." 7 An unwritten policy in
itself does not fall short of constitutionality.' Here, the dissent
determined the policy to be reasonable and nonarbitrary, because
the policy consisted of "fixed locations where the police have a
uniform, nonarbitrary policy of stopping vehicles," 9 and although
the police were on a roving patrol, "a roving patrol, narrowly
focused on a particular crime situation, has also been upheld:"' 9
[t]he indefiniteness of the term unreasonable
militates against the construction of a general rule
81 Id.
2 Id. at 147, 700 N.Y.S2d at 83 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557).
'3 Id. at 148, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 84 (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, and John BB.,
56 N.Y.2d at 485,438 N.E.2d at 864,453 N.Y.S.2d at 158).
4 Muhammad F., 92 N.Y.2d at 149, 700 N.Y.S2d at 84.
Id. at 151,700 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. See supra notes 4 and 8
and accompanying text.
8u Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 151,700 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 151,700 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (Smith, J., dissenting).
89 Id.
9o Id. Judge Smith noted that the police officers followed a procedure whereby
the officers stopped every third taxi and inquired as to the safety of the driver.
Id. at 151,700 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
2000
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of universal application for determining the validity
of official intrusions of this nature. Rather, the facts
of each case must be examined and the essential
inquiry is whether the police conduct may be
characterized as reasonable, which in turn requires a
balancing of the State's interest in the inquiry at
issue against the individual's interest in being free
from governmental interference. 9'
The dissent found it important to note here that, in regard to the
procedures undertaken by the police in this case and in John BB.,92
neither Martinez-Fuerte9' nor Brignoni-Ponce4 posed a barrier.95
Finally, the dissent discussed the issue of standing. "In order to
challenge the constitutionality of a search, the burden is on the
person challenging the search to demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy."96 Here, the dissent distinguished between
the privacy interests of the driver and those of the taxi's
passengers,' and determined that Muhammad F. and Keith
Boswell could not show "they had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the passenger compartment of the taxicabs."9'  For
example, Boswell denied that the bag found in the taxi (later
discovered to have contained drugs) was his,99 therefore, "he had
no reasonable expectation in that bag and, thus, no standing to
challenge its admission into evidence."'"
The language in the Federal"0 ' and the New York State O'
Constitutions regarding searches and seizures is identical.
91 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at'152, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (citing John BB., 56
N.Y.2d 482,438 N.E.2d 864,453 N.Y.S.2d 158) (Smith, J., dissenting).
92 56 N.Y.2d 482,438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Smith, J., dissenting).
93 428 U.S. 543.
91 422 U.S. 873.
95 Muhammad F., 94 N.Y.2d at 152, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 153, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 152, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Smith, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 153, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent cited many
seizure cases affirming its position. Id.
9 Id. Muhammad F.'s admission was not discussed here. Id.
100 Id. The majority assumed standing. Id. at 148, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
'0' U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
678 [Vol 16
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However, the search and seizure law in New York's Constitution"
has been interpreted in such a way so as to grant greater individual
protections.'O°
Carrie Foote
'02 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
101 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
104 31 NY JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 423 (1995).
2000 679
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